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Increasing taxation, reducing benefits, and raising the retirement age are popular topics of debate 
surrounding the Social Security program. Past research has shown that lower benefits decrease 
independent living and homeownership, and increases poverty amongst the elderly. However, the 
ability to live in desirable locations also impacts welfare. How do Social Security benefits 
reductions impact elderly migration and location choice? Higher local wages generally 
compensate higher local housing costs. However, unlike their children, Social Security recipients 
have mostly retired. With soaring metropolitan real estate prices and rent hikes, are those relying 
on Social Security benefits forced to move from high-cost to low-cost locations? What are the 
impacts on welfare if the elderly must live in lower-cost areas or potentially live farther from 
their children? I shed light on these questions by exploiting the Social Security notch to examine 
the effects of an exogenous decrease in Social Security benefits on where the elderly have 
chosen to live. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
About 83 percent of the $808 billion of Social Security outlays (about one quarter of 
federal spending) in fiscal year 2013 were paid to recipients of Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance.1 Since 2010, Social Security outlays have exceeded annual tax revenues, and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that these outlays will exceed tax revenues by an 
average of 12 percent for the next decade. With higher life expectancies, increasing numbers of 
the baby-boom generation reaching retirement age, and tax revenues remaining almost constant, 
the CBO projects that the Social Security program will have exhausted its funds by 2033. 
Increasing taxation, reducing benefits, and raising the eligible retirement age have been 
popular topics of national debate. None of these suggestions is widely supported. While most 
people that pay payroll taxes would not support increasing their taxes, reducing benefits or 
raising the eligible retirement age decrease the resources of those who depend on Social Security 
as their primary source of income. In his American Economic Association Ely Lecture, Jim 
Poterba reveals that within the elderly group of individuals aged 65 and older, individuals who 
are younger or married are “more likely to be in the top quartile of the income distribution” 
amongst elderly individuals, and the oldest members of this group are “more likely to depend on 
Social Security as their primary income source.”2 Moreover, the oldest of this group are 
disproportionately women, and women comprise 77 percent of the individuals in the lowest 
income quintile. Thus, Poterba’s statistics suggest that decreases in Social Security benefits 
would disproportionately impact older, divorced, widowed, never married, or female Social 
Security beneficiaries. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Congressional Budget Office, “The 2013 Long-Term Projections for Social Security: Additional Information,” 
accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44972. 
2 Jim Poterba, “Retirement Security in an Aging Population,” January 2014, http://economics.mit.edu/files/9494. 
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Over the years, several notable economists have studied the impact of decreases in Social 
Security benefits on elderly living arrangements (Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry 2005), elderly 
homeownership (Engelhardt 2007), elderly poverty (Engelhardt and Gruber 2004), elderly labor 
supply (Krueger and Pischke 1992), and elderly mortality (Snyder and Evans 2006). Existing 
research has thus examined how decreases in Social Security benefits impact some elderly 
behaviors, including whether they have shifted from buying to renting houses and whether they 
live independently or live in shared living arrangements, such as with their adult children. The 
conclusions suggest that homeownership and independent living are normal goods, where an 
increase in income would lead to an increase in the number of elderly individuals that own 
houses or live independently. The studies of home ownership and shared living arrangements 
provide compelling evidence that living arrangements change in response to Social Security 
income, but these are not the only aspects of living arrangements that matter for elderly welfare. 
Researchers have not yet examined the effect of decreases in Social Security benefits on elderly 
behavior with respect to other amenities, such as those that come with living in more desirable 
locations. Thus, the impact of decreases in Social Security benefits on location choice is an 
important dimension to study. 
In this paper, I examine how Social Security benefits impact elderly migration and 
location choice in the U.S. With soaring metropolitan real estate prices preventing even the 
working adult middle-class from buying homes and steep rent hikes further deterring them from 
renting, retirees relying on Social Security benefits may be forced to move from high-cost 
locations to low-cost locations as benefits decrease.3 Unfortunately, it is a reality that low-cost 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Neil Irwin, “Why the Housing Market Is Still Stalling the Economy,” The New York Times, April 24, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/upshot/the-housing-market-is-still-holding-back-the-economy-heres-why.html. 
Sanjay Bhatt, “Longtime Tenants Get the Boot from Upgrades, Soaring Rents,” The Seattle Times, accessed October 
11, 2014, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2024645099_rentsxml.html. 
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areas tend to be correlated with higher crime rates. Additionally, if retirees’ children are earning 
high wages that enable them to live in high-cost areas, decreases in Social Security income may 
force the elderly, who are no longer wage earners, to live farther away from their children or 
move from independent to shared living arrangements (perhaps with their children). Upon 
finding the relationship between Social Security benefits levels and the house values of the areas 
in which the elderly live, I estimate the impact of an inevitable cut in Social Security benefits on 
elderly location choice. I explore whether the elderly are migrating, and whether this migration 
has contributed to the rise of “retirement communities,” communities with predominantly elderly 
populations and amenities and services targeting the elderly. Although these communities have 
historically been located in suburbs, developers are considering building more elderly 
communities in urban areas—revealing shifting preferences favoring urban amenities.4 Finally, I 
consider whether the elderly end up living in shared or independent living arrangements in high 
or low-cost areas. By answering these questions, I hope to shed light on previously unconsidered 
ramifications of reductions in Social Security benefits. 
A simple comparison of elderly with higher versus lower Social Security benefits would 
be problematic because people with higher Social Security benefits differ in many ways from 
people with lower Social Security benefits. In particular, people with higher Social Security 
benefits will have earned higher incomes during their careers, will have more savings, will 
perhaps have higher pension benefits from their jobs, and thus may have different preferences for 
certain standards of living. To identify the effect of changing Social Security benefits, I exploit 
the Social Security notch, which enables me to observe otherwise identical individuals who 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Jim Carlton, “Bay Area Rally Sends Rents Soaring,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2013, sec. Real Estate, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324694904578602013087282582. 
4 Linda Baker, “Retirement Homes Go High-Rise and Urban,” The New York Times, April 1, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/business/yourmoney/01natreal.html. 
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receive different Social Security benefits based on the years they were born due to variations in 
Social Security policy. I examine the effects of an exogenous decrease in Social Security benefits 
on where the elderly have chosen to live—whether the decrease in benefits has caused a 
statistically significant shift in the proportion that choose to live in higher or lower cost areas. I 
also investigate whether their migration rates have shifted in response to changes in Social 
Security benefits. I use an instrumental variables strategy that isolates variation driven by 
differences in the legislative treatment of different birth cohorts, and compare results obtained 
using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on cross-sectional data from the Census with 
my instrumental variables results. 
In the next section, I discuss the Social Security notch in more detail, outline the 
construction of the instrument, and summarize what has been examined in previous literature, 
including research that utilizes the Social Security notch and other studies of elderly behavior. In 
Section 3, I discuss the data. Section 4 contains my empirical strategy. Results are outlined in 
Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, I discuss the implications of my findings and conclude with 
suggestions on what further research should be conducted. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Social Security Notch 
Before 1972, Social Security benefits levels were primarily based on an individual’s 
average nominal monthly earnings, with exclusions for some years of low earnings. The Social 
Security benefits formula included progressive replacement rates: upon retirement, individuals 
would receive a portion of their pre-retirement income as Social Security income. Each time 
Congress wanted to account for inflation or other cost-of-living adjustments, it had to change the 
benefits formula. The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act were intended to 
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automatically adjust Social Security benefits for cost-of-living increases beginning in 1975. 
However, the formula was poorly designed: average nominal monthly earnings increased with 
inflation over an individual’s lifetime, but Congress had also set the replacement rate for each 
earnings bracket in the benefits formula to increase with inflation. The resulting double 
indexation caused benefits to increase faster than inflation. Furthermore, those that retired after 
the “early” retirement age of 62 could significantly increase their benefits payments because 
benefits were linked to nominal earnings. Higher earnings later in life would displace lower 
earnings from earlier years, increasing the person’s average monthly earnings history and 
subsequent benefits payments. Coupled with the high inflation rates of the 1970’s, benefits 
increased rapidly for those who were receiving Social Security payments—specifically, those 
that were born in 1910 or earlier who retired at the “normal” retirement age of 65. For some 
recipients, the double indexation was projected to eventually cause benefits to exceed their pre-
retirement earnings. Without enacting any changes, the program would exhaust its funds. Thus, 
Congress changed the benefits formula in the 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act, 
creating the benefits “notch.” 
The 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act created variation in benefits across birth 
cohorts. Specifically, the benefits formula differed for those born before 1917, from 1917-1921, 
and after 1921. Those born before 1917 remained on the old, double-indexed benefits calculation 
formula. Those born between 1917 and 1921 were either retiring or soon-to-retire when the new 
benefits calculation would kick-in, so they served as transition cohorts with transitional rules. 
They could receive the higher of either the benefit they would receive under the new 1977 
amendments or the transitional guarantee, a modification of the pre-1977 amendment formula 
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that “produced declining real benefits for subsequent cohorts.”5 Most beneficiaries would receive 
higher benefits with the transitional guarantee, which also resulted in different levels of benefits 
payments for otherwise identical individuals, solely based on their birth cohort. Finally, those 
born after 1921 would receive the much lower benefits levels calculated by the post-1977 
amendment formula. This new formula removed the double indexation by indexing lifetime 
earnings to overall average wage growth and keeping the replacement rates for each earnings 
bracket constant. The brackets would be widened each year to account for inflationary wage 
growth. The new formula also made the benefits formula more actuarially fair by indexing 
average earnings and earnings brackets to the year in which the beneficiary turns 62; retiring 
later (with higher wages) would no longer displace lower earnings from earlier years. 
Instrumenting for Social Security Income 
As previously mentioned, analyzing the impact of Social Security benefits on where the 
elderly have chosen to live is problematic because the level of benefits they receive is contingent 
on their average lifetime monthly earnings. Those that have earned and saved based on different 
levels of earnings may have different preferences based on their past privileges and experiences. 
For example, those that have historically earned higher wages in the city may prefer to stay in 
higher-cost cities even after retirement, while those that have historically earned lower wages 
may prefer to live in suburban areas. The advantage of my strategy of using the Social Security 
notch is that I will observe otherwise identical individuals who receive different Social Security 
benefits based on the years they were born, rather than based on different lifetime earnings. Any 
difference in their migration behavior will be attributable to the different Social Security benefit 
payment levels that resulted from the variation in Social Security policy. Several scholars have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Alan B. Krueger and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, “The Effect of Social Security on Labor Supply: A Cohort Analysis of 
the Notch Generation,” Journal of Labor Economics 10, no. 4 (October 1, 1992): 412–37, 418. 
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utilized this instrumental variables strategy to analyze the effects of Social Security on the 
elderly and their behavior. 
Literature Review 
Existing research has taken advantage of the Social Security notch to examine how 
decreases in Social Security benefits impact the elderly and their decisions. Typically, they find 
that benefits decreases cause the elderly to reduce their consumption of normal goods and 
services. 
Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) use an instrumental variables approach that exploits 
the Social Security notch to estimate the impact of Social Security benefits on elderly living 
arrangements.6 They find that the estimated elasticity of living with others with respect to Social 
Security income is -0.4 for all elderly households, -1.3 for widows, and -1.4 for divorcees, with 
most of the effects concentrated on those without a college education. In contrast, individuals 
who were never married have an insignificant estimated elasticity of -0.4; there is no evidence to 
suggest that income levels affect the decision of married couples to live in shared arrangements. 
Their estimates suggest that widows and divorcees’ respond very differently from the never 
married and married elderly—the living arrangements of widows and divorcees are very 
sensitive to changes in income, and reductions in benefits would induce those elderly individuals 
to move from independent to shared living arrangements. In particular, they assume that if the 
behaviors of these cohorts can be extended to all of the current elderly, a 10 percent reduction in 
Social Security benefits would lead over 600,000 elderly households currently living 
independently to live in shared living arrangements. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Gary V. Engelhardt, Jonathan Gruber, and Cynthia D. Perry, “Social Security and Elderly Living Arrangements: 
Evidence from the Social Security Notch,” The Journal of Human Resources 40, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 354–72. 
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Engelhardt and Gruber (2004) studied the impact of Social Security benefits on elderly 
poverty. They analyzed the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1968 to 2001 and 
restricted their analysis to the birth cohorts of 1880 to 1935, using the Social Security notch to 
construct their instrument.7 Over this time period, the poverty rate for their CPS sample fell from 
28.3 percent to 11.6 percent, while their instrument indicated that Social Security benefits rose 
by $5760, or 91 percent. Thus, their IV linear estimate implies that the $5760 increase in benefits 
would lead to a 17.8 percent decline in poverty rates. Since this estimate was almost exactly the 
same as the 16.7 percent decline in poverty experienced by these elderly, they believe that the 
change in Social Security benefits can explain all of the decline in elderly poverty. Using their 
instrument to analyze the CPS data, they find that Social Security has a stronger effect on 
poverty for elderly families than households. This is not surprising, since their definition of an 
elderly “family” only includes a Social Security beneficiary, his or her spouse, and any children 
under the age of 18 in the household. On the other hand, elderly households may include other 
(non-elderly) income-earning adults. The stronger effect on elderly families than elderly 
households may be caused in part by the increase in independent living as a response to rising 
Social Security benefits. Independent living keeps the number of elderly families constant, but 
increases the number of elderly households. This creates a downward bias in estimates 
concerning elderly households, since the elderly may direct all of their additional Social Security 
income towards independent living arrangements while continuing to live in poverty. For elderly 
families, the elasticity of poverty to benefits is around one, indicating that reductions in Social 
Security benefits significantly increase elderly poverty. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Gary V. Engelhardt and Jonathan Gruber, “Social Security and the Evolution of Elderly Poverty,” NBER Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper 10466 (May 2004). 
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Krueger and Pischke (1992) utilize the notch to analyze the labor force participation of 
older men.8 They use panel data and measure the impact of Social Security benefits by 
performing a logit regression on a reduced-form labor-supply equation. They find little evidence 
to support that fluctuations in Social Security income influence the labor supply of older men. 
However, they do find a significant increase in labor force withdrawal at ages 62 and 65, the 
“early” and “normal” Social Security retirement ages, perhaps as a response to liquidity 
constraints. They suggest that the elimination of double indexation by the 1977 amendments 
reduced the incentive for older men to remain in the workforce and thus encourage early 
retirement. However, their analysis indicates that the growth in Social Security benefits in the 
1970’s could explain less than one-sixth of the decline in male labor force participation during 
that time. Interestingly, they find that for later cohorts, who faced declining Social Security 
wealth, labor supply continued to fall as well—indicating that the trend in decreasing labor 
supply was correlated with, but not a result of, declining Social Security wealth. They suggest 
that the impact of Social Security wealth on male labor force participation may be small because 
Social Security wealth is only a small portion of overall wealth. 
Snyder and Evans (2006) investigate the impact of Social Security benefits on elderly 
mortality using difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity models.9 Unlike the studies 
previously cited, which examined numerous birth cohorts before and after the notch, Snyder and 
Evans only examine half of two birth cohorts: those born in the second half of 1916 and the first 
half of 1917. They found that the people in these two groups were very similar in terms of 
income, labor force participation rates, and work intensities—differing only in the amounts of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Alan B. Krueger and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, “The Effect of Social Security on Labor Supply: A Cohort Analysis of 
the Notch Generation,” Journal of Labor Economics 10, no. 4 (October 1, 1992): 412–37. 
9 Stephen E. Snyder and William N. Evans, “The Effect of Income on Mortality: Evidence from the Social Security 
Notch,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 88, no. 3 (2006): 482–95. 
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Social Security benefits they received because of their birth cohorts. Interestingly, they find that 
those born in 1916, who ended up receiving significantly higher Social Security benefits 
(triggering an income effect), had higher mortality rates than the 1917 cohort. They attribute this 
to the fact that the 1917 cohort did more part-time work post-retirement and were also 5 
percentage points more likely to work while they were 68-70 years old. In this case, part-time 
work keeps the elderly engaged and may help prevent social isolation, which is a cofactor in 
mortality. These results would not necessarily contradict those found by Krueger and Pischke 
(1992), since the 1917 cohort was performing part-time work while “retired” and collecting 
Social Security benefits. For these two cohorts, they suggest that the amount of income and the 
source of income (via part-time work) may be equally important. However, they note that 
different results may occur if the income effect was generated through a wage change instead. 
For example, if the 1917 cohort received higher incomes from wage increases rather than from 
engaging in part-time work, higher income may increase mortality (like it did for the 1916 
cohort) rather than decrease mortality. Finally, they suggest that these implications are 
significant, but may differ for later birth cohorts, perhaps because of the changing nature of jobs, 
lifestyles, etc. 
Engelhardt (2007) examines the effect of Social Security benefits on elderly 
homeownership.10 He notes that while Social Security benefits have been rising significantly 
over the last twenty-five years, the homeownership rate of elderly households (65+ years) has 
risen, while the homeownership rate of 35-64 year old households has not changed significantly. 
An IV approach enables him to isolate the causal effect of Social Security benefits; he estimates 
that the elasticity of homeownership to Social Security benefits ranges from 0.26 to 0.49 for all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Gary V. Engelhardt, “Social Security and Elderly Homeownership,” Journal of Urban Economics 63, no. 1 
(January 2008): 280–305, doi:10.1016/j.jue.2007.02.005. 
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the elderly. When broken down by marital group, widows are most responsive to benefits 
changes. His results suggest that between half to all of the rise in elderly homeownership can be 
attributable to the rise in Social Security benefits over the last twenty-five years; thus, reducing 
those benefits would significantly alter the rate of elderly homeownership. 
My project uses the empirical strategy from these previous studies and builds on their 
results by shedding further light on the effect of Social Security on elderly living arrangements. 
In particular, my research is consistent with Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry’s finding that the 
elderly prefer independent living arrangements. Engelhardt (2007) also supports my finding that 
there is no evidence to support that Social Security income impacted elderly migration within the 
past five years, perhaps because rising Social Security benefits have led to high homeownership 
rates among the elderly. 
III. DATA 
Sample Selection 
I analyze the 5 percent sample from the U.S. Census, years 1980, 1990, and 2000, at the 
individual unit of observation. From this 5 percent sample, I take a random 20 percent subsample 
of households for data workability while ensuring that my subsample would still be 
representative of each Census sample. In constructing my sample, I follow the methodology used 
by Engelhardt and Gruber (2004), Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005), and Engelhardt (2007). 
I first classify the observations into “families,” separate from households. Families consist of a 
household head, his or her spouse, and any children in the family aged 18 or under. Thus, in any 
Census household, there may be more than one family as I have defined above. Adults who are 
not the spouse of the household head are considered to be part of a separate family. Three 
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unmarried adults would constitute three separate families. These would include other relatives, 
adult children over 18 years of age, and other inhabitants living in the same house. 
Next, I assign one member in each family to be a Social Security beneficiary if they fit 
the following criteria. I assume that people start collecting Social Security benefits when they 
become eligible to do so at age 65, as most do in practice. Thus, men and never-married women 
who are at least 65 years of age, and divorced or widowed women who are at least 62 years of 
age are assigned to be Social Security beneficiaries. The first two groups are most likely to 
receive Social Security benefits based on their own past earnings histories. However, since men 
have tended to earn higher incomes than women, I assume that widowed and divorced women 
choose to receive higher benefits based on their former or deceased spouses’ earnings histories 
rather than lower benefits based on their own earnings histories. As Engelhardt, Gruber, and 
Perry outline, widowed and divorced Social Security beneficiaries are assumed to be at least 62 
years of age because the median age difference between spouses for the widowed and divorced 
elderly is three, as tabulated from the 1982 Social Security New Beneficiary Survey. Widowed 
and divorced elderly are thus assumed to be able to collect Social Security benefits at age 62, 
when their former spouses who would be eligible to receive Social Security at age 65 would start 
collecting benefits. Families where the Social Security beneficiary’s marital status is separated 
are not included, since it is unclear how Social Security benefits would impact the behavior of 
the beneficiary vs. the beneficiary’s separated spouse. 
Once Social Security beneficiaries are assigned, the sample is restricted to only families 
containing a Social Security beneficiary. Thus, my sample consists of 511,663 families from a 
random 20 percent subsample of the 1980, 1990, and 2000 5 percent U.S. Census samples. 
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Geographic Specifications 
I base my analysis of elderly location choice on the Census’ Public Use Microdata Areas 
(PUMAs). PUMA definitions are constant over time. In addition, PUMAs cover the entirety of 
the United States, are geographically contiguous, are based on census tracts and counties, and 
contain at least 100,000 people. However, since the 1980 sample uses county groups for 
geographic areas instead of PUMAs, I use broader geographic areas (consistent PUMAs) that 
remain consistent from 1980 to 2000 so that their definitions do not change for my three Census 
samples. There are a total of 543 consistent PUMAs in my samples. For the rest of this paper, 
“geographic area” or “area” refers to the consistent PUMA in which a beneficiary resides. 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents sample means for selected variables, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. All monetary figures are presented in 1982-1984 dollars. The median house value of 
the consistent PUMAs in which the elderly reside is about $73,000. The median rent per month 
is about $287. In comparison, annual Social Security income is about $5,609, or $467 a month 
on average. Total family income (the income of the Social Security beneficiary and his or her 
spouse) is about $17,000 a year, or $1,400 a month. On average, about 12.4 percent of residents 
of a consistent PUMA are Social Security beneficiaries. 
The mean proportion living in shared living arrangements ranges from about 16 percent 
of married Social Security beneficiaries and 46 percent of never married beneficiaries, and is 
about 28 percent pooled over all Social Security beneficiary families. About 15 percent live in 
shared living arrangements in high-priced areas (as defined later in this section), while 12 
percent live in shared living arrangements in low-priced areas. In comparison, about 36 percent 
live in independent living arrangements in high-priced areas, while another 36 percent live in 
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independent living arrangements in low-priced areas. Most beneficiaries did not move within the 
past five years, with 78 percent living in the same house. About 5 percent moved from outside 
the state or country within the past five years. 
Construction of the Instrument 
While there is variation across the different papers that have used the Notch instrument, 
such as differences in the specific birth cohorts included, the instruments largely follow the same 
strategy.11 The goal of the instrument is to isolate variation in Social Security benefits driven by 
policy differences across birth cohorts rather than systematic differences in characteristics or pre-
retirement behavior. In this project, I use an instrument created by Professors Engelhardt, 
Gruber, and Perry, and modified by Professor Engelhardt, to control for these confounding 
factors so that I can assess the impact of Social Security benefits levels on elderly migration and 
location choice. 
Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) assign an earnings history to the 1916 birth cohort 
based on the median earnings of the males in that cohort, as recorded in the Social Security 
Administration’s Annual Statistical Supplement. They assign this same earnings history for 
never-married women, since their analysis of CPS data revealed that the earnings of never 
married women are correlated more with that of men than with that of other women.12 The 1938 
supplement is used to assign the earnings level at age 22, 1943 supplement for age 27, etc. Since 
the data is given for the age ranges 20-24, 25-29, etc., they assume linear wage growth between 
the intervals. In assigning earnings levels beyond age 60, they index the cohort’s median 
earnings at age 60 to Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation. Since many workers no longer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 I would like to thank Professor Gary Engelhardt from Syracuse University for providing his instrument for use in 
my project. 
12 Gary V. Engelhardt, Jonathan Gruber, and Cynthia D. Perry, “Social Security and Elderly Living Arrangements: 
Evidence from the Social Security Notch,” The Journal of Human Resources 40, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 354–72, 361. 
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worked full-time after reaching age 60, the median earnings would be much lower than what an 
average worker would have earned full-time.  
Since people with advanced degrees tend to earn higher levels of income and thus receive 
higher levels of Social Security income, Engelhardt (2007) modifies the instrument to 
accommodate this variation. Education levels are separated into four groups: less than high 
school, high school diploma, some college, and completed college or advanced degree. 
Engelhardt scales the median earnings history for each of these education groups using the 
percent difference in mean male annual earnings from the median annual earnings at age 54 in 
the March 1971 CPS for males in the 1916 birth cohort. These real earnings histories are thus 
based on the male median annual earnings of the 1916 birth cohort, with variation based on 
education level. 
Because increases in human capital and productivity may lead to wage growth over time, 
causing variation in Social Security benefits levels that do not result from variations in Social 
Security policy, Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) assign the earnings profile of the 1916 
cohort to all of the birth cohorts, indexed to CPI inflation. Thus, for any particular education 
level group, the real earnings history is the same, regardless of birth cohort. 
These earnings histories are then inputted into the Social Security Administration’s 
ANYPIA program, which calculates an individual’s monthly benefit (PIA) at retirement based 
on the individual’s date of birth, date of retirement, and earnings history. Birthdays of June 2 are 
assigned to every birth cohort, and they assume that people retire and claim their benefits in 
June. While different cohorts may have different average actual retirement ages, variation in 
retirement age may generate differences in benefit levels (i.e. identical individuals that retire at 
age 62 would receive lower benefits than those that retire at 67) not attributable to variation in 
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Social Security policy. To get a retirement-age-weighted PIA for each cohort, they first calculate 
the benefits for each possible retirement age for each cohort. Then, they apply the same weight to 
the retirement-age-specific benefits for each cohort, based on the actual distribution reported in 
the 1985 Annual Statistical Supplement. Since wives can claim their own benefits or benefits 
equal to half of their spouse’s, married couples are assigned 150 percent of the retirement-age-
weighted PIA. Finally, they account for the Social Security Administration’s periodic increases 
in nominal benefits, which adjust for “cost of living adjustments” (COLA’s) and inflation, and 
produce a COLA-adjusted Social Security monthly benefit for each cohort. They complete their 
instrument by multiplying the COLA-adjusted benefit level by 12 to get the predicted annual 
benefit for each cohort. In my project, the instrument, Social Security income, house values, and 
monthly rents are all adjusted to 1982-1984 dollars for comparability across years. 
Since I am analyzing the exogenous changes in Social Security benefits levels resulting 
from the Social Security notch, my birth cohorts of interest must span the years before, during, 
and after the birth cohorts affected by the changes in policy. As such, my instrument covers 
Social Security beneficiaries from birth cohorts 1900 to 1928. 
Figures 1a-1c present graphs of Social Security income against the instrument by birth 
cohort. Figure 1a presents the graph based on Social Security income data from the 1980 Census, 
and includes birth cohorts 1900-1915, with some divorcees and widows from birth cohorts 1916-
1918. Figure 1b is based on Social Security income data from the 1990 Census and expands 
upon the birth cohorts included in Figure 1a to include all birth cohorts from 1900-1925, with 
divorcees and widows from cohorts 1926-1928. Figure 1c only includes birth cohorts 1906-1928, 
since there are no observations from the 1900-1905 birth cohorts in the 2000 Census sample. 
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A few factors may explain why the instrument and actual Social Security income match 
less well in Figure 1a than in the other figures. While my instrument assumes that people are 
retiring at age 65 and accounts for variation in average retirement age between cohorts, as 
previously mentioned, it was possible for those born in cohorts 1916 and earlier to increase their 
Social Security benefits by delaying retirement and earning higher wages in their later years. 
These higher wages would displace low wages from earlier years or increase their average 
lifetime earnings, so that they would receive higher benefits upon retirement. It is also possible 
that those in my sample lived longer than their peers because they continued to work and retired 
later, an idea supported by Snyder and Evans (2006). Additionally, while high inflation during 
the 1970’s raised benefits for all cohorts that had retired, those born after 1910 had the additional 
benefit of wage increases during their last few years of work, resulting in even higher Social 
Security payments—the “double indexation” corrected by the 1977 amendments. Although the 
double indexation impacted Social Security income data in the 1980 Census, its effects were 
magnified over the years and more visible in the 1990 Census data. Finally, people that have 
higher incomes tend to have longer lifespans, so members of the 1900 birth cohort who are 
reflected in the 1980 Census may have had higher than average incomes (and thus higher Social 
Security benefits) than their deceased peers. This effect would be weaker for older beneficiaries 
in the 1990 and 2000 Census, since the expected lifespan of an adult in the U.S. increased from 
74 in 1980 to 77 in 2000.13  
Figures 1b and 1c are most illustrative of the variation in benefits, since they include the 
Social Security income data of beneficiaries of all marital statuses for the birth cohorts affected 
by the changes in the benefits formulas. As shown in Figures 1b and 1c, benefits for males with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 World Bank. “Life expectancy at birth, total (years).” Accessed April 22, 2015. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN. 
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the median earnings history rise steadily until the 1909 birth cohort, rise steeply for the 1910-
1916 birth cohorts, fall sharply for the 1917-1921 birth cohorts, and then rise more slowly for 
subsequent cohorts. In Figures 1b and 1c, the graph of actual Social Security incomes by cohort 
follows the instrument well, with the notch evident in the empirical data. Thus, there is a good 
first-stage relationship: the trends in my instrument predict the trends in actual Social Security 
incomes. This instrument accounts for variation in benefits by birth cohort and education level. 
Dependent Variables 
I use a variety of dependent variables to analyze the impact of Social Security benefits on 
elderly migration and location choice. 
To analyze the impact of Social Security benefits on elderly location choice, I first find 
the median house value (monthly rent) in each consistent PUMA for Census years 1980, 1990, 
and 2000. Then, I create two variables: the natural log of median house value and the natural log 
of median monthly rent. I analyze the impact of Social Security benefits on the log of the median 
house value (monthly rent) of the geographic area in which my observations reside because the 
median house values (monthly rents) are skewed to the right, as shown in Figures 4-5. 
My next dependent variable accounts for both migration and location choice. I examine 
the joint decision of housing costs and shared living arrangements: whether the elderly may be 
moving into shared or independent living arrangements, and whether there is a shift in the 
proportion that live in high or low-cost areas. Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) find that 
decreases in Social Security benefits lead to the elderly living in shared instead of independent 
living arrangements, where shared living arrangements mean that there is more than one family 
(as delineated for this paper) living in a particular Census household. If the elderly are moving 
into shared living arrangements in areas with high median house values, this movement can 
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likely be associated with the elderly moving in with their children or other relatives, rather than 
with other elderly families. Thus, I create variables to describe whether the elderly are living in 
shared arrangements in high median house value areas, shared arrangements in low median 
house value areas, independent arrangements in high median house value areas, or independent 
arrangements in low median house value areas. 
In classifying which areas are high versus low median house value areas, I find the 
median of the median house values (monthly rents) in each consistent PUMA in each Census 
year. This median house value is the median house value (monthly rent) of all the consistent 
PUMAs in the U.S. as defined by the Census. Then, I consider anyone who resides in a 
consistent PUMA with a median house value (monthly rent) that is greater than this median 
house value (monthly rent) to be living in a high-cost area. I define those who reside in 
consistent PUMAs with a median house value (monthly rent) that is less than or equal to this 
median house value (monthly rent) as residing in a low-cost area. High and low-cost areas are 
redefined for each Census year, since changing metropolitan dynamics may redefine which areas 
are comparatively high or low-cost. If consistent PUMAs retain their high or low-cost status 
throughout my three Census samples, I would not be able to accurately assess the income impact 
of Social Security benefits on elderly location choice. I must also acknowledge the limits of my 
analysis: although I can estimate the impact of increases in Social Security income on the 
proportion of elderly that are living in shared or independent living arrangements in high or low-
cost areas, I am unable to tell whether the elderly are moving into or just not moving out of 
shared or independent living arrangements in high or low-cost areas. 
Furthermore, I analyze whether the elderly are living in geographic areas in which the 
residents are older on average. Are they potentially choosing areas with strong retirement 
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communities? Or, are the elderly being increasingly forced to move to these areas as a result of 
changes in Social Security benefits levels? 
Finally, I examine whether the elderly are migrating. I analyze elderly migration based on 
their self-reported migration history over the past five years in the Census. I classify the elderly 
as having moved if they have moved within their state, from a different state, or from abroad. My 
Census sample would not include anyone that moved abroad in the past five years since they are 
no longer in the U.S. I also examine whether Social Security benefits impact whether the elderly 
are making big moves, which include moves across states or moving abroad. 
Overall, my analyses on migration and location choice enable me to look at how Social 
Security income impacts where the elderly have chosen to live and whether they have moved 
within the past five years.  
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To examine the effect of Social Security on elderly migration and location choice, I use 
the following specifications, with different dependent variables to assess effects on migration 
and location choice: 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
(1) Yit = !Xit + "SSIncomeit + #Zit + $it, 
For this Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification, i signifies observation at the 
individual level and t signifies observation from a particular Census year. Y is the dependent 
variable being observed (i.e. natural log of median house value, natural log of median monthly 
rent). X is a vector of all demographic variables, including education level, race, sex, marital 
status (in the pooled sample), and age and year fixed effects. SSIncome is the amount of Social 
Security income a beneficiary receives, in $’000’s for ease of interpretation. I use the level rather 
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than the log of Social Security income because of the high percentage of Social Security 
beneficiaries with zero Social Security income (as shown in Figure 7). However, because the 
distribution of Social Security income is skewed towards the right, I look at log-log 
specifications as a robustness check in Section V. Z is a vector of spouse age and spouse 
education fixed effects (only for the married samples). By controlling for these demographic 
characteristics, I control for other trends that may be correlated with both effects of the changes 
in policy and the places that people from these birth cohorts have chosen to live. $ is an error 
term, clustered by cohort and education level. Parameters ! and # indicate the change in 
dependent variable Y resulting from the set of demographic variable controls and spouse fixed 
effects (only for the married samples). Finally, the coefficient of interest, " indicates the impact 
on dependent variable Y for a $1,000 increase in Social Security income. 
I expect " to be biased upward due to the endogenous impact of higher earnings histories 
on higher Social Security benefits levels. People with higher earnings histories (and higher 
Social Security benefits) are likely to have higher savings, which they can use to purchase 
homes. The higher their earnings history, the more they would have been able to save over the 
years, and the more they would have been able to put towards purchasing a house. Thus, " would 
pick up both the effects of a $1,000 increase in Social Security income and a higher earnings 
history. However, " may also be biased downward due to attenuation bias. If Social Security 
income were measured incorrectly, the variance of the measurement error appears in the 
denominator and not the numerator of the regression coefficients, biasing the coefficients 
towards zero. The larger the measurement error, the closer the regression coefficients will be to 
zero. Next, I move to a discussion of my Instrumental Variable regression, which in theory 
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eliminates both of these biases and suggests the causal effect of changes in Social Security 
benefits on my dependent variables. 
Instrumental Variable Regression 
(2) Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression 
First-Stage: SSIncome =  %Xit + &Instrumentit + 'Zit + (it 
Second-Stage: Yit = !Xit + "!!"#$%&'it + #Zit + $it, 
I instrument for Social Security income using my instrument constructed from predicted 
Social Security benefits based on median earnings histories, with variations in benefits levels for 
different education levels. With this instrument, I assume that my instrument is not correlated 
with any of my other independent variables. Once the demographic and fixed effects outlined 
above are controlled for, the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. Thus, the only way 
my instrument affects my various dependent variables is through its effect on Social Security 
income. My first stage regressions test whether my instrument is correlated with Social Security 
income; results for these regressions are presented with the IV regression results. 
My Instrumental Variable (IV) regression is a two-stage-least-squares regression. The 
independent control variables in the IV regressions are the same as those in the OLS regressions. 
In this two-stage-least-squares regression, the first-stage regression isolates the part of Social 
Security income that is uncorrelated with the error term $. Predicted values of Social Security 
income that account for observations’ demographic characteristics are obtained by applying the 
coefficients from the first-stage. The second-stage regression then takes these predicted Social 
Security income values as the independent variable (in place of the observed Social Security 
income values from the Census in the OLS specifications). 
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Dependent Variables and Regression Transformations 
For my main results, I analyze OLS and IV regressions with the natural log of median 
house value and the natural log of median monthly rent as the dependent variables. Dependent 
variable Y in the specifications outlined above would be the log of the median house value 
(monthly rent) for the consistent PUMA in which the unit of observation resides. 
As previously mentioned, I analyze the log of my dependent variables because the 
median house values and median monthly rents of the consistent PUMAs are skewed towards the 
right. Taking the log of these values makes the distribution of the values more normal. 
For these sets of regressions, a possible interpretation would be: a $1000 increase in 
Social Security income predicts that a Social Security beneficiary will remain in (move to) an 
area with a 100 x " percent higher median house value (monthly rent). Explanations for the other 
dependent variables I analyze are explained in the results section. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A preliminary look at the relationship between my instrument and the median house 
value (monthly rent) in each consistent PUMA reveals that there appears to be a positive 
relationship between the Social Security benefits predicted by my instrument and the median 
house value (monthly rent) in the consistent PUMAs in which the elderly live. This relationship 
is shown in Figures 2a-2c for median house values and Figures 3a-3c for median monthly rents. 
The graphed values represent the mean of the median house values (monthly rents) of all 
consistent PUMAs for each birth cohort. Although all house values (monthly rents) are presented 
in 1982-1984 dollars, data from each Census sample is presented separately so that changes in 
these median house values (monthly rents) that result from shifting proportions of Social 
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Security beneficiaries living in higher or lower-cost areas are not conflated with natural increases 
in house values. 
My regressions support my initial observation of a positive relationship between Social 
Security income and the median house value (monthly rent) of the consistent PUMAs in which 
the elderly live. My regressions analyze the median house value (monthly rent) because the 
median is less sensitive to abnormally large or low values. Small communities of high (low) 
house values (monthly rents) may bias the mean house value (monthly rent). All regression 
models use person weights as provided in the Census data. Standard errors are included in 
parentheses below each coefficient. For easier interpretation, Social Security and instrument 
levels are divided by 1,000. Unless indicated otherwise, each coefficient represents the predicted 
impact of a real $1,000 increase in annual Social Security benefits on each dependent variable. 
Columns 2-5 and 7-10 in each Tables 2-6 and Table 8 present the coefficients for 
subsamples of my pooled sample, with each column representing the results for observations 
with different marital statuses. I examine the effect of Social Security income on the migration 
and location choices of beneficiaries with different marital statuses because their marital status 
may affect how they respond to changes in Social Security income in regards to where they 
choose to live. For example, married couples tend to live independently from adults who are not 
in their family (as defined for this project), and may have multiple sources of income that can 
impact where they choose to live. On the other hand, widows and divorcees may be more 
dependent on Social Security income, have fewer additional sources of income, and thus may be 
more responsive to changes in Social Security income. All three of these groups differ from 
beneficiaries that have never married, since they are all more likely to have had children whose 
costs they may have to cover. Perhaps they have chosen to live in higher-cost areas with better 
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public school systems in the past, or they may have sold their houses in order to pay for their 
children’s college tuition. Additionally, widows, divorcees, and never married individuals can 
move more easily, since they tend to have fewer or zero family members who may need to 
relocate and find new jobs if they were to move as a family. No matter what reasons each group 
may have for staying in (moving to) higher (lower) cost areas, as mentioned in Section II, 
previous authors have found widows and divorcees to be particularly sensitive to changes in 
Social Security income. Thus, I expect these two groups to be particularly sensitive in my 
analysis as well. 
Location Choice: Social Security income level impact on log (median house values / rents)  
Table 2 presents the regression results for the natural log of median house value as the 
dependent variable. Panel A presents the OLS estimates, with Social Security income in levels, 
while Panel B presents the first-stage and instrumental variable estimates, with the instrument for 
Social Security income in levels. The coefficient of 0.002 for the pooled sample is significant at 
the 1-percent level, indicating that for each $1,000 increase in annual Social Security income, an 
elderly individual is predicted to live in an area with a 0.2 percent higher median house value. 
However, the OLS estimates may be biased due to endogeneity, since those that receive higher 
Social Security benefits have had higher lifetime earnings histories. Panel B presents the first-
stage and instrumental variable estimates. All of the first-stage coefficients are significant at the 
1-percent level, indicating that my instrument fits well as a predictor of Social Security income. 
The IV results suggest that for each $1,000 increase in annual Social Security income, an elderly 
individual with the median earnings history is predicted to live in an area with a 1.5 percent 
higher median house value. 
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For both the OLS and IV results, the coefficients are significant for the pooled and 
married samples. Results are significant at the 1-percent level in both OLS and IV regressions for 
the never married sample. It is interesting that I find statistically significant effects on the 
opposite set of marital groups to Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005). My results suggest that 
while married and never-married Social Security beneficiaries are not responsive to Social 
Security income on the shared living arrangements margin, they are responsive to Social Security 
income in their decisions about where to live. 
The effects of Social Security income seem to differ across subsamples as well. Social 
Security income has the largest effect on the median house value of the consistent PUMA where 
never married beneficiaries live. My OLS results suggest that for each $1,000 increase in Social 
Security income, there is an estimated 1.1 percent increase in the median house value for never 
married beneficiaries, compared to only 0.1 percent for married beneficiaries and 0.2 percent for 
the pooled sample. Similar differences magnitude are suggested by my IV results: there is an 
estimated 8 percent increase in the median house value for never married beneficiaries, 
compared to 1.1 percent for married beneficiaries and 1.5 percent for the pooled sample. Perhaps 
these results are indicative of a combination of factors that have differing effects on each group. 
For example, the never married beneficiaries may have no dependents, so changes in Social 
Security income would have a more substantial impact on where they choose to live. 
Additionally, married beneficiaries receive more Social Security income as a unit (1.5 times, 
since the spouse would also receive benefits), so any change in Social Security benefits levels 
would be magnified when considering the total amount of Social Security benefits received by 
the family. This interpretation relies on my assumption of economies of scale in housing costs—
a married couple requires less than twice as much housing (value) as two single individuals do. 
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Notably, the coefficients on Social Security income for the IV are all larger orders of magnitude 
than those in the OLS regressions, suggesting that the coefficients in my OLS regressions are 
biased downward. 
Table 3 presents the regression results for natural log of median monthly rent as the 
dependent variable. As expected, these results are similar to those for log (median house value). 
In the OLS results, the coefficient of 0.004 for the pooled sample is significant at the 1-percent 
level, indicating that for each $1,000 increase in annual Social Security income, an elderly 
individual is predicted to live in an area with a 0.4 percent higher median monthly rent. Again, 
the OLS estimates may be biased due to endogeneity. The first-stage coefficients are the same 
for this set of regressions, since the instrument still instruments for Social Security income 
levels. The IV results suggest that for each $1,000 increase in annual Social Security income, a 
typical elderly individual is predicted to live in an area with a 1.4 percent higher median monthly 
rent. Again, for both the OLS and IV results, the coefficients are significant for the pooled and 
married samples, and results are statistically significant at the 1-percent level in both OLS and IV 
regressions for the never married sample. For log (median monthly rent), however, results are 
also statistically significant for both the widowed and divorced samples in the OLS. These 
results may be indicative of the same factors mentioned above, which have differing effects on 
never married and married beneficiaries. Again, the coefficients on Social Security income for 
the IV are all larger orders of magnitude than those in the OLS regressions, even though the 
coefficients are no longer statistically significant for the widowed and divorced samples. 
Based on the evidence from the above regressions, my IV results suggest that the Social 
Security income beneficiaries receive has a very real and significant impact on the area in which 
they choose to live. 
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Migration: Are the elderly moving? 
Next, I examine if and how changes in Social Security income impact elderly migration. I 
first look at whether the elderly move at all (within state, across states, or abroad), with the 
dependent variable being the proportion of Social Security beneficiaries that have moved within 
the past five years. I also look at whether the elderly make big moves (across states or abroad), 
with the dependent variable being the proportion that have made big moves within the past five 
years. My results for these two sets of regressions would indicate that a $1000 increase in Social 
Security income predicts that the proportion of beneficiaries that moved at all or made a big 
move within the past five years would increase by 100 x " percentage points. 
Table 4 presents my results for whether Social Security income impacts whether the 
elderly have moved within the past five years. My results for the OLS regressions in Panel A 
indicate that Social Security benefits levels have a significant impact on whether the elderly 
choose to move. In particular, for the pooled sample, a $1,000 increase in Social Security income 
predicts a 0.4 percentage point increase in the probability that the beneficiaries’ families moved 
in the past five years. However, in this case, the OLS estimates may be biased, perhaps due to 
endogeneity. The IV results presented in Panel B indicate that there is no evidence that a $1,000 
increase in Social Security income has had a significant impact on the probability that 
beneficiaries’ families moved in the past five years. In fact, the predicted impact changes from 
increasing the probability beneficiaries’ families have moved (OLS results) to decreasing the 
probability for all samples, except for the never married sample. 
These results are not surprising, since choosing to move is a big decision, and most 
people do not move frequently if they own their homes. On average, at the time each Census was 
taken, 79 percent of my sample lived in the same house as they did five years earlier, and 76 
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percent either owned their home or had taken out loans with the intention of eventually owning 
their homes.14 With such a high homeownership rate, it is not surprising that changes in Social 
Security benefits levels would not have substantial effects on elderly migration. The OLS 
regression is probably picking up the endogenous impact of higher lifetime earnings on higher 
Social Security income, and including the impact of earnings and savings on whether 
beneficiaries’ families have chosen to move versus staying in a home they may own. 
Table 5 presents my results for whether changes in Social Security benefits levels impact 
whether Social Security beneficiaries are making big moves, meaning that they moved from 
another state or country. Although I did not find that Social Security income had any statistically 
significant effects on whether the elderly moved at all, it is worth examining whether Social 
Security income has effects on whether the elderly make big moves, since moves to higher or 
lower cost areas may be obscured by small moves within the same area. A quick look at the 
sample indicates that 14 percent of my sample has moved within the same state in the past five 
years. Unfortunately, I can only examine where people are moving at the state level—I do not 
have information on which consistent PUMAs the elderly are moving to or from. 
Similar to the results for whether the elderly are moving at all, the OLS results are 
statistically significant, but probably biased. The IV results are not statistically significant. My 
OLS results indicate that for each $1,000 increase in Social Security income, there is an 
estimated 1 percentage point reduction in the probability that the elderly are making big moves. 
My IV results suggest that there is no evidence of an effect of Social Security income on whether 
the elderly are making big moves. It is interesting that a $1,000 increase in Social Security 
income marginally (0.2 percentage points) increases the probability divorcees will make big !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Statistics based on pool of 357,189 observations (56,318 observations with N/A for the migrated in the past 5 
years variable were omitted from these statistics). 
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moves in the OLS specification but decreases (1.2 percentage points) the probability they will 
make big moves in the IV specification; it marginally decreases (0.2 percentage points) the 
probability that never married beneficiaries will make big moves in the OLS specification but 
increases (0.5 percentage points) the probability that they will make big moves in the IV 
specification. These mixed results indicate that Social Security income does not have a 
statistically significant impact on elderly migration, since there is not much impact even when I 
only look at big moves. 
Migration: Does Social Security income impact the rise of retirement communities? 
To assess whether the elderly are moving into retirement communities or retiree-oriented 
cities, I create a variable for the mean age of the consistent PUMAs in which the elderly live. A 
possible interpretation would be: a $1000 increase in Social Security income predicts that a 
Social Security beneficiary will remain in (move to) an area with " years higher (lower) mean 
age. 
Table 6 presents my analysis on whether Social Security income impacts the rise of 
retirement communities. As with my results on whether the elderly are moving, my results are 
statistically significant for most OLS regression samples and not statistically significant for most 
of my IV regression samples. Interestingly, I find marginally statistically significant impacts in 
my IV regression of the widowed sample. My results indicate that for each $1,000 increase in 
Social Security income, there is a predicted 0.100 increase in the mean age of the area in which 
widowed beneficiaries have chosen to live. This suggests that increases in Social Security 
income would lead widowed beneficiaries to move to retirement communities. Although my IV 
results are not statistically significant for the divorced, married, and never married samples, my 
coefficients suggest that increases in Social Security income would lead all three groups of 
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beneficiaries to move away from retirement communities. These areas with lower mean ages are 
likely to have other amenities—perhaps the beneficiaries are able to remain in more convenient 
metropolitan areas with younger people who are still in the workforce. I would conclude that 
Social Security income has no substantial impact on the rise of retirement communities at the 
consistent PUMA level, but a closer analysis of more narrowly defined geographic areas may be 
fruitful. 
Location Choice: The joint decision of living arrangements and location 
In Table 8 in the Appendix, I have included my replication of the study done by 
Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005). I find similar results: all coefficients in my OLS and IV 
regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, with the exception of never married 
beneficiaries in the IV model. My OLS results suggest that for each $1,000 increase in Social 
Security income, there is an estimated 1.3 percentage point decrease in the proportion of Social 
Security beneficiaries living in shared living arrangements for the pooled sample. As a 
comparison, Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry find an estimated 0.88 percentage point decrease in 
their OLS model. Again, my IV model suggests stronger impacts: for each $1,000 increase in 
Social Security income, there is an estimated 2.6 percentage point decrease in the proportion of 
Social Security beneficiaries living in shared living arrangements for the pooled sample. 
Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry find similar changes in magnitude between their OLS and IV 
models: they find an estimated 2.1 percentage point decrease in their IV model. 
I extend Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry’s analysis to assess whether the elderly are 
moving into shared or independent living arrangements in high or low-cost areas. I assume that it 
costs the most to live in an independent living arrangement in a high-cost area, and costs the least 
to live in a shared living arrangement in a low-cost area. Since the elderly have retired, if the 
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elderly are moving from independent to shared living arrangements, specifically shared living 
arrangements in high-cost areas, I would predict that some of this movement can be explained by 
the elderly moving to live with their children. However, if they are moving from independent to 
shared living arrangements in lower cost areas, the explanation is less clear. For these sets of 
regressions, a possible interpretation would be: a $1000 increase in Social Security income 
predicts that a Social Security beneficiary is 100 x " percentage points more likely to remain in 
(move to) a shared (independent) living arrangement in a high (low) cost area. 
Table 7 presents the regression results. My interpretation relies on my assumption that if 
the elderly are living in shared living arrangements in high-cost areas, some of them are living 
with their children (or other relatives). Since Social Security beneficiaries are retired, they may 
no longer have the means via high-paying wages to enable them to live in higher cost areas such 
as metropolitan areas. Thus, if they are living in a shared living arrangement, they may be living 
with their children who are still in the labor force. In the table, “high price” signifies living in an 
above-median house price area, while “low price” signifies living in an at or below-median 
house price area. 
Notably, I find statistically significant results for changes in shared living arrangements 
in high and low-cost areas and independent living arrangements in high-cost areas. These results 
build on the results presented in Tables 4 and 5, perhaps capturing the effect of Social Security 
income on beneficiaries’ local moves. For example, increases in Social Security income may 
enable them to move from shared living arrangements in high-cost areas to independent living 
arrangements in the same high-cost areas. These results may also indicate that increases in Social 
Security benefits would enable beneficiaries to remain in high-cost areas rather than having to 
move to low-cost areas because of their reduced income. If increases in Social Security income 
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do have a statistically significant effect on whether the elderly are living in high-cost areas, but 
76% of the elderly own or will own their homes, this relationship may also explain why there is a 
low proportion of Social Security beneficiaries that have been moving within the past five years. 
The coefficient of -0.007 in Column (1) of Panel A in my OLS results suggests that for 
each $1,000 increase in Social Security income, there is a predicted 0.7 percentage point 
reduction in the probability that a Social Security beneficiary is living in a shared living 
arrangement in a high-cost area. Similarly, the coefficient of -0.008 in Column (2) suggests that 
for each $1,000 increase in Social Security income, there is a predicted 0.8 percentage point 
reduction in the probability that a Social Security beneficiary is living in a shared living 
arrangement in a low-cost area. Since the $1,000 increase in Social Security income predicts that 
the beneficiaries are moving out of shared living arrangements, they must be moving into 
independent living arrangements—as supported by the coefficient in Column (3). The coefficient 
of 0.010 in Column (3) suggests that for each $1,000 increase in Social Security income, there is 
a predicted 1 percentage point increase in the probability that a Social Security beneficiary is 
living in an independent living arrangement in a high-cost area. These results are in line with the 
conclusions of Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005), suggesting that with increases in Social 
Security income, beneficiaries would move from shared living arrangements in both high and 
low-cost areas to independent living arrangements in high-cost areas. 
The IV regressions indicate similar results, with larger orders of magnitude. As shown in 
Columns (5), (6), and (7), an $1,000 increase in Social Security income predicts a 1.7 percentage 
point reduction in the probability a Social Security beneficiary is living in a shared living 
arrangement in a high-cost area, a 0.8 percentage point reduction in the probability a Social 
Security beneficiary is living in a shared living arrangement in a low-cost area, and a 3.2 
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percentage point increase in the probability a Social Security beneficiary is living in an 
independent living arrangement in a high-cost area. 
Thus, increases in Social Security income actually enable beneficiaries to move from 
shared living arrangements to independent living arrangements, and from low-cost areas to high-
cost areas. 
Robustness Check 
As shown in Figure 6, the distribution of Social Security income is skewed towards the 
right, motivating an analysis of Social Security income in a log transformation rather than in 
levels. However, because over 20 percent of those who are age-eligible for Social Security 
receive zero Social Security income in my Census samples, I use my instrument as an instrument 
for total family income. As shown in Figure 7, a smaller proportion of beneficiaries have zero 
total family income. For these sets of regressions, a possible interpretation would be: a 1 percent 
increase in total family income (as an indicator for Social Security income) predicts that a Social 
Security beneficiary will remain in (move to) an area with a 100 x " percent higher median house 
value (monthly rent). It is reassuring that I find similar trends in my results even with log-log 
specifications. 
(1) Location Choice: Log (Total Family Income) Impact on Log (Median House Values) 
Results are presented in Table 9. My OLS results indicate that for a 1 percent increase in 
total family income, there is an estimated 0.08 percent increase in the median house value of the 
consistent PUMA where a beneficiary lives. Again, the IV results suggest a stronger relationship: 
for a 1 percent increase in total family income, there is an estimated 0.15 percent increase in the 
median house value of the consistent PUMA where a beneficiary lives. Comparing my results 
from my IV log-log specifications to those from my Social Security income – log (median house 
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value) in Table 2, I lose statistical significance for my married sample in my IV results, but my 
coefficient is still statistically significant for the never married sample—suggesting an estimated 
0.33 percent increase in median house value for each percent increase in total family income. 
(2) Location Choice: Log (Total Family Income) Impact on Log (Median Monthly Rent) 
Results are presented in Table 10. My OLS results indicate that for a 1 percent increase in 
total family income, there is an estimated 0.06 percent increase in the median house value of the 
consistent PUMA where a beneficiary lives. Again, the IV results suggest a stronger relationship: 
for a 1 percent increase in total family income, there is an estimated 0.11 percent increase in the 
median house value of the consistent PUMA where a beneficiary lives. Comparing these results 
to those from my Social Security income – log (median monthly rent) results from Table 3, I 
retain statistical significance for both my married and never married samples—suggesting an 
estimated 0.09 and 0.21 percent increase, respectively, in median monthly rent for each percent 
increase in total family income. 
Long-Term Impact 
According to the Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees 2014 report, the 
Disability Insurance trust fund will be depleted as early as 2016.15 The Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance trust fund will be depleted in 2034. As a response to the depletion of the Disability 
Insurance trust fund, payroll taxes may be reallocated between the two trust funds. As a result, 
they project that the Old Age, Survivors And Disability Insurance Trust Fund will be depleted by 
2034. After the reserves are depleted, tax income would be able to pay for 77 percent of 
scheduled benefits in 2033 and 72 percent in 2088. As such, I project what will happen to elderly 
location choice once there is a 23 percent benefits cut. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Social Security Administration, “Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs,” accessed April 21, 2015, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr14summary.pdf. 
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Overall, a 23 percent benefits cut would lead to a 1.95 percent decrease in the median 
house value of the consistent PUMA in which a Social Security beneficiary lives. For widowed 
and divorced beneficiaries, the magnitude of the impact is smaller—only a 1.02 percent decrease 
for widows and a 1.81 percent decrease for divorcees. Married beneficiaries fare about the same 
as the pooled sample, with the 23 percent benefits cut leading to a 1.98 percent decrease in the 
median house value. Never married beneficiaries appear to be most responsive to Social Security 
income, with a 23 percent benefits cut leading to never married beneficiaries living in consistent 
PUMAs with 6.59 percent lower median house values. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
My findings raise important questions about how location choice impacts elderly welfare. 
I find statistically significant impacts of increases in Social Security income on elderly location 
choice, but cannot say whether Social Security income enables the elderly to move to expensive 
areas or stay in expensive areas. This motivates a study on whether Social Security income has 
significant impacts on elderly migration. Although I do not find evidence of an effect of Social 
Security income on elderly migration, perhaps this is because I can only observe migration in the 
past five years and where they moved from at the state level. People may have made migration 
decisions more than five years ago, knowing about changes in their future income or Social 
Security benefits levels. Further research should investigate elderly migration patterns over 
longer time periods and between more narrowly defined geographic areas, and if possible, take 
into account their reasons for moving. Living in areas with higher median house values and rents 
is a normal good, as is living independently (Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry 2005). My model 
indicates that with higher Social Security income, Social Security beneficiaries are likely to 
move from shared living arrangements in both high and low-cost areas to independent living 
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arrangements in high-cost areas. Areas with higher median house values and monthly rents tend 
to have more amenities, lower crime, and higher average education levels. For elderly 
individuals, this may mean increased convenience and safety, and thus higher welfare. This 
implies that when Social Security income is reduced, Social Security benefits are likely to be 
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Table 1. Sample Means for Selected Variables, with Standard Deviations in Parentheses, for Years of 
Birth from 1900–28, Using the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census 
 
Variable Pooled Widowed Divorced Married Never Married 
Median House Value 72820 71734 77963 72280 77407 
 (41796) (41047) (46070) (40971) (45358) Median Rent Per Month 287.32 284.63 299.17 287.44 291.64 
 (98.37) (97.97) (99.16) (98.74) (96.97) Social Security Income 5609 4442 3745 7855 3631 
 (3820) (2663) (2793) (4308) (2849) Total Family Income 17059 11087 11911 26620 12479 
 (27363) (13292) (14677) (39238) (15463) Mean Age 42.840 42.852 42.673 42.878 42.740 
 (2.404) (2.353) (2.330) (2.510) (2.231) Share Elderly in Area of 0.1238 0.1236 0.1216 0.1243 0.1250 
Residence (0.0292) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0306) (0.0268) 
Shared Living Arrangement 0.2771 0.3283 0.3438 0.1638 0.4649 
 (0.4476) (0.4696) (0.4750) (0.3701) (0.4988) Shared Living Arrangement  0.1538 0.1783 0.2031 0.0943 0.2516 
in High Price Area (0.3607) (0.3828) (0.4023) (0.2922) (0.4339) 
Shared Living Arrangement  0.1234 0.1500 0.1408 0.0695 0.2133 
in Low Price Area (0.3289) (0.3571) (0.3478) (0.2543) (0.4097) 
Independent Living Arrangement  0.3630 0.3254 0.3665 0.4225 0.2952 
in High Price Area (0.4809) (0.4685) (0.4819) (0.4940) (0.4561) 
Independent Living Arrangement  0.3598 0.3462 0.2897 0.4137 0.2399 
in Low Price Area (0.4799) (0.4758) (0.4536) (0.4925) (0.4270) 
Did not move,  0.7808 0.7622 0.6841 0.8266 0.7818 
past 5 years* (0.4137) (0.4258) (0.4649) (0.3786) (0.4130) 
Moved from out of state, 0.0484 0.0476 0.0620 0.0483 0.0373 
past 5 years* (0.2145) (0.2129) (0.2411) (0.2144) (0.1895) 
Less Than High School 0.4132 0.4600 0.3566 0.3703 0.3874 
 (0.4924) (0.4984) (0.4790) (0.4829) (0.4872) High School Diploma 0.3240 0.3404 0.3455 0.3036 0.2949 
 (0.4680) (0.4738) (0.4755) (0.4598) (0.4560) Some College 0.1330 0.1184 0.1703 0.1459 0.1195 
 (0.3395) (0.3231) (0.3759) (0.3530) (0.3244) College Diploma 0.1298 0.0813 0.1276 0.1802 0.1982 
 (0.3361) (0.2732) (0.3336) (0.3844) (0.3987) Female 0.5021 0.8471 0.6831  0.6261 
 (0.5000) (0.3599) (0.4653)  (0.4838) White 0.8946 0.8773 0.8576 0.9256 0.8892 
 (0.3071) (0.3281) (0.3494) (0.2625) (0.3139) Observations 413507 197740 32000 156584 27183 
*Observations (migrate variables) 357189 172362 28046 133935 22846 
 
Note: Median house value, median rent per month, Social Security income (annual), and total family income 
(annual) are presented in 1982-1984 dollars. For migration variable means, 56,318 observations with N/A for the 
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